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Introduction
Lord Rothschild proclaimed compound interest 
to be the “eighth wonder of the world.” Warren 
Buffett reportedly often skipped haircuts as a 
young man because of his calculation of the 
future contribution to his retirement funds from 
the money saved given what he projected as 
investment returns on these savings compound-
ing over several decades. These two highly 
sophisticated investors correctly appreciated the 
importance over time of compounding effects on 
future asset levels. 
The effects of compounding are also quite rel-
evant to foundations in, among other things, 
correctly accounting for inflation — for purposes 
including determining the appropriate return 
targets and levels of risk in managing endow-
ment assets, analyzing the feasibility of perpetual 
versus spend-down strategies, and comparing 
amounts invested in program areas over time. 
There is clearly a powerful compounding effect 
of inflation on a foundation’s endowment. (See 
Figure 1.) Beginning with a hypothetical founda-
tion’s investment portfolio in 1985, after 30 years 
Key Points
 • This article demonstrates the relevance of 
correctly accounting for inflation to foun-
dation structure and programs – including, 
for example, in analyzing perpetual versus 
spend-down strategies and in comparing 
the cost-effectiveness of programs over dif-
ferent time periods. Investment teams must 
also be provided with return targets, which 
are highly sensitive to inflation and which in 
turn determine a risk estimate that must be 
considered by foundation fiduciaries. 
 • Seemingly small differences in inflation 
estimates will become material over time. 
But at many foundations, systematic biases 
are frequently built into inflation estimates. 
These biases are often attributable to a 
failure to consider the nature of the costs 
specific to types of grantees and programs. 
 • This article presents data illustrating the 
potential magnitude of these differences, 
and suggests adjustments to better account 
for these attributes as well as how these 
adjustments should be applied in projecting 
future results and in interpreting prior period 
performance.
Seven and a half cents doesn’t mean a thing. 
But give it to me every hour, forty hours every week, 
That’s enough for me to be living like a king.
– The Pajama Game (1954)
doi: 10.9707/1944-5660.1369
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— in 2015 — the effects of inflation at the average 
rate that has prevailed in the U.S. for the last 20 
years (2.26 percent) would reduce the real value 
of that portfolio by approximately 50 percent. 
The reduction is even greater at the inflation rate 
that actually prevailed over the entire 30-year 
period: 2.7 percent.
Purchasing power is hopefully maintained, of 
course, by earning a return on the portfolio 
equal to or greater than the rate of inflation (plus 
earning enough to cover the effective 5 percent 
mandatory rate of distribution). Seemingly small 
mistakes in predicting inflation, if subjected 
to the effects of compounding over time, can 
become material.1 Indeed, what may seem to be 
an inconsequential concern can have a consider-
able effect on the long-term view of how valuable 
philanthropic assets are best leveraged for grant-
ees. Systematic biases built into a foundation’s 
estimate of inflation in considering the real pur-
chasing power of its asset base can, over time, 
detract meaningfully from the accuracy of such 
estimates. Foundations that believe they are on 
a path to ensuring perpetual or long-term opera-
tions may be spending down without realizing it.
An error of only 50 basis points in predicting 
inflation would materially affect the important 
target that must be set in terms of the necessary 
return — and quite significantly, therefore, the 
amount of risk — on which investment strategies 
must be based to preserve purchasing power. 
After 15 years and 30 years, respectively, such 
an error — again using 1985 as the base year 
and the average inflation rate for that 30 years 
— would have caused the return necessary to 
offset the erosion of purchasing power due to 
inflation to be underestimated by more than 9 
percent at the end of 15 years and approximately 
1Prez, the union leader in The Pajama Game, saw this clearly. He sought a 7-1/2-cent hourly increase, which by itself would 
have produced $9,432 in additional earnings over the period from the week in May 1954, when the musical debuted on 
Broadway, through the end of December 2015 — a healthy accumulation, given this very modest salary increase, but 
somewhat limited in aggregate amount. But assuming a historically reasonable 6 percent equity rate of return on this small 
raise continuously compounded, that amount grows more than 10-fold, to $105,245. Even taking inflation into account — 
assuming Prez neglected to negotiate an inflation-adjusted increase and using a 3 percent estimate of inflation for the period 
— that amount still grows to $27,866 in real purchasing power (i.e., 1954 dollars), though the potent effect of accounting for 
even only a 3 percent inflation rate is obvious. As further discussed in this note, underestimating inflation by 50 basis points 
(i.e., if the costs experienced by Prez’s union members actually increased annually by 3.5 percent rather than 3 percent) would 
reduce the constant dollar value of the deal Prez negotiated by 18 percent, to $22,824.
FIGURE 1  Effect of Inflation on Real Value of Endowment
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15 percent after 30 years. (See Figure 2.) There 
is reason to believe that such a 50-basis-point 
error is far less than the systematic biases that 
actually affect foundation predictions. Also, the 
calculation here does not take into account the 
5 percent distribution requirement for all foun-
dations, which further affects the pressure on 
investment returns as further discussed in the 
analysis below. Fortunately, however, a founda-
tion can take relatively simple steps to incorpo-
rate important considerations into its analysis of 
inflation to reduce the likelihood of at least some 
of this inherent bias. 
What Type of Grantee?
The common denominator among the simple 
steps suggested here is the introduction into a 
foundation’s investment policies of certain con-
siderations concerning the types of grantee orga-
nizations served by the foundation. For several 
reasons, the inflation confronted by many grant-
ees can, and likely does, vary materially from 
general macroeconomic price indices. This is not 
to say, however, that a foundation needs to exam-
ine with great particularity the specific effects of 
inflation on each grantee. Several general fac-
tors can be incorporated into the foundation’s 
inflation outlook to account for much of the 
difference between inflation as it is relevant to 
the foundation’s particular mission and price con-
siderations which may apply for the economy as a 
whole but not for the grantee base in question.
This is also not to suggest that a foundation’s 
aggregate annual grantmaking should some-
how be tied to measures of inflation in the inter-
ests of the organizational sustainability of the 
nonprofits it supports, however desirable this 
might be. The reality is that most foundations, 
other than those in spend-down mode, focus first 
on meeting basic minimum distribution require-
ments with perhaps some adjustment on aggre-
gate grantmaking based on actual investment 
results. But a step in every foundation’s strategy 
is the construction of an investment portfolio 
to maintain real purchasing power if the foun-
dation aims to exist in perpetuity or over an 
extended period. 
This requires setting an investment returns tar-
get, which in turn determines a risk estimate 
that a foundation must consider in analyzing 
whether the return target is prudent as a matter 
of financial stewardship. This is unavoidable. 
Endowment managers cannot be left to “do the 
best they can”; they necessarily require return 
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FIGURE 2  Effect of Error in Prediction of Rate of Inflation
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targets, which turn in part on the degree of 
acceptable risk given the risk-reward alternatives 
that characterize portfolio management. 
From all this follow two key points: First, a 
return target that systematically underestimates 
inflationary pressures each year, enhanced by the 
effect of compounding, will have material con-
sequences on the ability to maintain purchasing 
power even if the annual underestimates appear 
to be small. Second, factoring into the analysis 
some measure of the general nature of differing 
inflation faced by categories of grantees is neces-
sary to avoid such annual underestimates. 
Now it is certainly the case that a given group 
of foundation stewards may review the level of 
return required to maintain purchasing power, as 
measured by their set of grantees, and the associ-
ated level of portfolio risk that would have to be 
assumed to achieve that level and conclude that 
it is imprudent to adopt such portfolio strategy. 
They may quite reasonably conclude to make 
fewer, smaller, and/or shorter grants as the dollar 
level of the endowment and grantmaking decline 
in real terms. But over the long term, for these 
stewards or their successors, this is a decision to 
accept a shrinking foundation with, at least in the-
ory, an end-date to material grantmaking. There 
is, of course, nothing wrong with such a con-
clusion and it may in many cases be the prudent 
course. But such a decision should at the very 
least be an explicit one. Because it is easy to over-
look the compounding effect of seemingly small 
annual underestimates of inflation and/or to fail 
to account for the inflation which a foundation, 
given its mission, actually confronts, it is easy 
for foundation executives to fail to see that their 
market returns are “low” even if they exceed the 
5 percent return roughly required to cover annual 
minimum distributions, and that their assets are 
therefore “shrinking” in real terms. 
With respect to the compounding effect of sys-
tematically underestimating inflation, an annual 
inflation estimate that is, for example, too low 
by only 75 basis points — again less, as discussed 
below, than some of the built-in biases may sug-
gest — would mean that at current historically 
low inflation rates, after 10 years the foundation’s 
assets would be less than 93 percent of what is 
required to maintain purchasing power and 
after 20 years would be only 86 percent of that 
amount.2 And this may go unrecognized, as such 
foundations rarely go back to reassess purchasing 
power in comparison with the real value of the 
endowment in prior periods. 
Foundations, given minimum distribution 
requirements, will typically set an investment 
target in the form of 5 percent plus some long-
term inflation projection. Such a calculation may 
already somewhat understate the task facing the 
investment team, as a portion of expenses — 
such as investment expenses and excise taxes (on 
net investment income) — do not count toward 
the foundation’s 5 percent minimum distribution 
requirement, despite the fact that these are real, 
unavoidable costs depleting assets. Any underes-
timate of the long-term degradation of purchas-
ing power due to inflation could materially add 
to the failure to reflect fully the difficult hurdles 
faced by a foundation’s spending policy over 
extended periods.
Any underestimate of the 
long-term degradation of 
purchasing power due to 
inflation could materially add 
to the failure to reflect fully 
the difficult hurdles faced by a 
foundation’s spending policy 
over extended periods.
2For purposes of this calculation, an inflation rate of 2.26 percent (the actual average U.S. rate for 1995-2015) was compared 
with an estimate that adjusted inflation by 75 basis points higher (3.61 percent). Adding these rates to the 5 percent required 
minimum distribution produced a difference in the amount necessary to preserve real purchasing power (and assuming that 
the 5 percent required distributions are made at the same rate over the course of the year as returns are earned on the asset 
base) of $94,799 after 10 years on a $1 million endowment, reflecting an underestimate of inflation by 27.5 percent ($345,275 
versus $250,476).
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What Measure of Inflation?
Many foundations, in adding an inflation com-
ponent to their target returns, use some version 
of the projected Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
some long-term estimate of the gross domestic 
product (GDP)-deflator, or some other general 
macroeconomic measure, such as the spreads 
between market rates and inflation-protected 
market rates, all of which have strengths and 
weaknesses as a measure. The CPI, for example, 
is based on a specific basket of roughly 80 goods 
or services, which likely do not accurately reflect 
the costs grantees must face. Core inflation, CPI-
based indices used by some philanthropic enti-
ties, exclude gas and food prices. While using a 
core inflation index is justifiable in terms of eco-
nomic theory, grantees may well have to drive 
and eat. As suggested in an example below, how-
ever, the core index may be appropriate — for 
certain purposes, as long as it is not employed 
as the full inflation factor. Even GDP-deflator 
indices, which use all prices of goods and ser-
vices throughout the economy, do not accurately 
reflect the specialized costs affecting many types 
of grantees. The same can be said of projecting 
inflation through market spreads, such as those 
between long-term Treasuries and those that 
are indexed to protect the holder against the 
effects of inflation — so-called Treasury Inflation 
Protected Securities.
The most general factor that needs to be (but 
rarely is) incorporated into a foundation’s think-
ing about inflation is that many — likely most 
— grantees are labor-intensive enterprises. As 
such they do not enjoy the productivity increases 
accruing to capital-intensive (especially technolo-
gy-intensive) enterprises. Thus, their costs can be 
expected to rise at a higher rate than the general 
level of inflation. As a general matter, then, foun-
dations should consider adding some reasonable 
premium to traditional macroeconomic indices 
of inflation in order to model more accurately 
what is required to maintain purchasing power 
from the perspective of their grantees.
Beyond this broadly applicable characteristic 
of labor intensity, for some grantees there may 
be specialized indices that capture additional 
elements of the cost environment faced by a 
foundation’s grantees. To take a specific exam-
ple, foundations funding projects associated with 
educational institutions may be well advised 
to consider the Higher Education Price Index 
(HEPI) rather than the CPI as a means of esti-
mating long-term inflation. As David Swensen, 
the brilliantly successful manager of the Yale 
endowment, has noted, the HEPI 
measures cost specific to educational institutions. 
Heavily weighted towards salaries and other 
personnel costs, over its 46-year history HEPI 
advanced at a rate approximately 1.4% per annum 
in excess of the GNP deflator. Lack of productivity 
gains in education account for the greater inflation 
and academic costs. (Swenson, 2000, p. 34) 
Not surprisingly, Yale uses the HEPI as the basis 
for determining the investment returns neces-
sary to produce constant purchasing power by its 
endowment. In some recent years, the HEPI has 
more closely approached the CPI. In fact, in 2011 
the HEPI was lower than the CPI by more than 
70 basis points. This historical anomaly was due 
to the structural endowment deficits produced 
by the 2008 economic crisis and the resulting 
response of educational institutions in the form 
of budget and hiring freezes. Over long periods, 
however, the pattern has been the one noted by 
Swenson of HEPI rates of inflation materially in 
excess of those measured by the CPI. For the five-
year period ending in 2015, the HEPI was up a 
cumulative 11.2 percent versus 8 percent for CPI, 
notwithstanding the aforementioned abnormally 
low increases in the HEPI in some recent years. 
In 2014 and 2015, for example, the HEPI exceeded 
the CPI by more than the historical increment 
of 1.4 percent. A misestimate of 1.4 percent in 
the inflation estimate would mean that over 
the course of only 20 years a foundation would 
shrink by almost a quarter of its real asset value 
if it had been pursuing and achieving an invest-
ment return objective of 5 percent plus CPI.
Other examples are plentiful of foundations that, 
by virtue of the nature of their programs and the 
specific cost considerations faced by their grant-
ees, should perhaps consider adding a further 
premium on general rates of inflation in their 
modeling of the long-term effects of inflation 
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on their purchasing power. One case would be 
foundations that make a significant investment 
in buildings or other items requiring major con-
struction projects. Construction inflation indices, 
though volatile and perhaps cyclical, often run 
higher than regular CPI inflation, on the order of 
75 to 100 basis points or more per year. Thus, for 
example, during the period of 2009–2015 the con-
struction index has recorded compound inflation 
of 16.5 percent, or 700 basis points higher than 
the CPI (9.5 percent). 
Another example might be foundations that fund 
scientific or medical research. The specific infla-
tion-index calculated for research expenditures, 
the Biomedical Research and Development Price 
Index (BRDPI), tends to run consistently higher 
than traditional inflation indices. During the 
same 2009–2015 period, for example, this index 
has increased by 14.2 percent, more than 4 per-
cent greater than the CPI. Such a differential, 
especially over an extended period, would cause 
a foundation that fails to account for the specific 
inflation environment faced by its grantees to 
underestimate seriously the investment returns 
required to preserve constant purchasing power. 
There are certain specific reasons why the 
BRDPI may not work well to capture a specific 
foundation’s inflation situation, but measure-
ment problems do not justify entirely excluding 
such a consideration from long-term planning. 
As a general matter there is material variation in 
the compounding growth rates of different infla-
tion indices over time. (See Figure 3.)
It should be noted that there are no well-estab-
lished forecasts of the HEPI, biomedical cost 
indices, or construction costs. This is admit-
tedly different from the CPI, where there are 
direct or inferred values for future expectations. 
This is not, however, a justification for revert-
ing to the use of the CPI for forward-looking 
measures of the returns necessary to preserve 
actual purchasing power. (This is distinct from 
assessments looking back at whether purchas-
ing power has been preserved or, as discussed 
below, to analyze amounts previously granted, 
where historical measures are readily available.) 
As a practical matter, then, although a founda-
tion may be forced to start with CPI expectations 
to determine the desired endowment returns, 
a premium should be added to that calculated 
with reference to historical experience. Various 
academic institutions, for example, in budgeting 
for future construction costs, grow those costs 
to account for inflation at expected CPI plus a 
FIGURE 3  Various Inflation Indices
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specified number of basis points. Such academic 
institutions therefore should, in determining the 
investment returns necessary to preserve the 
purchasing power of their endowments, grow at 
least the pro rata portion of their required invest-
ment returns allocable to construction expenses 
by this higher level of inflation expectations.
A potentially very important consideration in 
grantee-specific inflationary pressures involves 
not the nature of the work, but instead the loca-
tion of the grantee. This arises for foundations 
engaged in international grantmaking. Inflation 
rates outside the U.S., particularly in the devel-
oping world, often run several percentage points 
higher per year than in the U.S. To some extent, 
exchange-rate adjustments will offset the higher 
inflation rate. But the offset is far from perfect. 
Exchange rates vary for reasons other than just 
the comparative rates of inflation, including 
government and central bank policy, interest rate 
differentials, trade balances, and other economic 
considerations. To account for this the World 
Bank calculates a Purchasing Power Parity Index 
by country in order to assist those in one coun-
try in budgeting their funding, with the goal 
of maintaining constant purchasing power for 
their projects when costs will be denominated in 
another currency. 
The effects here can certainly be material. Take 
the hypothetical example of a U.S. foundation 
that makes grants in Ecuador, Israel, Bolivia, 
Nigeria, India, and Vietnam (selected for illus-
trative purposes both because of their geograph-
ical diversity and the diversity in their locally 
calculated rates of inflation). Assume grants 
were made in these jurisdictions between 2010 
and 2014. During this period — and assuming, 
for simplicity, grants of equal amounts — the 
portion of the foundation’s endowment support-
ing these grants had to cope with compound 
aggregate inflation of 71.24 percent during 
those years versus a CPI increase of only 8.5 
percent.3 Adjusted annual average inflation rates 
for each of the six foreign countries ran from 
FIGURE 4  Adjusted Rates of Inflation
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3The calculation of the “real” inflation rate (net of exchange-rate adjustments) was derived by dividing the compounded 
cumulative CPI for 2010-2015 by the change in the relevant exchange rate (i.e., the number of units of local currency per US$ 
on Dec. 31, 2015, divided by the same exchange rate value of Jan. 1, 2010). For Ecuador, whose local currency is the dollar, this 
meant that the real compounded inflation rate for the period was the full 16.8 percent experienced in the local economy. An 
alternative calculation could be derived using the World Bank’s Purchasing Power Parity Index.
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a low of 1.64 percent to a high of 15.1 percent, 
again contrasted with the U.S. average of 1.52 
percent. This reflects considerable pressure on 
the endowment not reflected in a U.S.-indexed 
model. (See Figure 4.) 
Hedging options, which might be desirable 
from the grantee’s perspective to ensure that it 
receives a constant amount denominated in local 
currency, would simply make the grantee subject 
entirely to the domestic inflation rate without 
the possibility of a potential partial offset from 
exchange-rate movements. Again, the point here 
is not that a foundation needs to attempt to grow 
its annual grantmaking capacity to hold grant-
ees harmless from the effects of such inflation. 
Rather, the inevitable moral of this story is that 
given the true inflation faced by such grantees, 
their donors must either calibrate their endow-
ment-management targets (and risk assumptions) 
to take this into account or accept that, given an 
international mission, the real value of their asset 
base will decline — perhaps sharply — over time.
Which Model – Perpetual 
or Spend-Down?
Beyond issues associated with the management 
of a foundation’s endowment, the issue of com-
pounding and inflation may also relate to a fun-
damental question of foundation existence. A 
growing number of foundations and sponsors 
are considering the relative merits of seeking to 
remain in existence in perpetuity versus a spend-
down model. Obviously, spending down over a 
short period of time may largely avoid the infla-
tion issue. The possible higher inflation rates if 
one takes a grantee-specific approach to calculat-
ing anticipated inflation over time may therefore 
be a significant factor in tipping the balance of 
that analysis. 
The current economic environment would not 
appear to offer a great degree of optimism for 
maintaining purchasing power over the long 
term for most foundations. A grantee-specific 
inflation rate of even only 75 basis points over 
the CPI, given the Federal Reserve inflation tar-
get of 2 percent and allowing for expenses and 
excise taxes not includable in the IRS’s minimum 
distribution requirements plus the 5 percent min-
imum distribution, might suggest a return target 
of 8 percent or more. Of course, if anticipated 
rates of return on investment even approach the 
grantee-adjusted rate of anticipated inflation plus 
5 percent (plus possibly some additional amount 
for expenses and taxes that are not includable), 
that might be an important factor arguing for 
continuing existence. While at times bull equity 
markets may have made 8 percent seem like a 
conceivable — although not likely — target, the 
consensus view now would almost certainly be 
to bet “the under” on achieving that target going 
forward (at an acceptable level of risk) given the 
fundamentals and growth issues being experi-
enced by most developed and developing econ-
omies. Again, this analysis suggests that even 
foundations that, due to board decision or the 
requirements of founding documents, believe 
they are on the road to perpetuity may in fact be 
spending down without awareness of that fact.
For a foundation adopting or considering a 
perpetual model, an awareness that returns of 
more than 8 percent might be required to main-
tain its purchasing power in perpetuity is only 
the beginning, not the end, of an important 
analysis and delicate balancing act. It should 
trigger an iterative process of assessing endow-
ment return targets, acceptable risk levels, and 
the structure and duration of program portfo-
lios. What does an 8-plus percent target imply 
for expected endowment volatility, the ability to 
For a foundation adopting or 
considering a perpetual model, 
an awareness that returns of 
more than 8 percent might 
be required to maintain its 
purchasing power in perpetuity 
is only the beginning, not the 
end, of an important analysis 
and delicate balancing act.
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comfortably meet commitments, and projected 
spending rates? 
Higher return targets necessarily imply greater 
projected portfolio volatility. Although riskier 
portfolios can be constructed with an expected 
return at these higher levels, the price of these 
higher expected returns is higher volatility, i.e., 
less certainty that the target will be what is actu-
ally realized (otherwise, the portfolio would 
not be “riskier”). It is true that this volatility 
runs in both directions. It may be reasonable to 
assume that you are just as likely to beat your 
target as to fall short. But there is an important 
asymmetry here: It is always easier to spend 
more money without long-term commitments 
than it is to adapt, in a relatively short time 
frame, to a reduction in available funds when 
returns fall short. Foundation fiduciaries are 
well-advised to consider these possibilities in 
advance rather than when the storm has arrived. 
Stress testing can be useful here. What payout 
rates would follow from an x percent decline 
in endowment value? Are these rates accept-
able? Program personnel need to be involved 
in these analyses. What would the program 
reaction be if funds available for grants declined 
by x percent for even a few years? Is the mix of 
short-term and longer-term commitments such 
that there is the flexibility to respond quickly to 
sub-target investment returns, or is the founda-
tion effectively locked in and forced to accept a 
higher spend rate of, say, 6 percent, 7 percent, 
or more even for a few years? These questions 
all become of heightened importance for a foun-
dation that is trying to exceed, after accounting 
for distributions, ordinary inflation rates in its 
investment returns due to grantee-specific cost 
considerations.
Such a foundation may be well advised to have 
some “swing” capacity in its programs, i.e., 
short-term commitments that could be rap-
idly reduced in the event endowment volatility 
requires decreased spending for a time. These 
could be either in the mix of initiatives within 
each program or separate programs recognized 
as providing the necessary swing capacity. 
Again, it is also possible that return targets that 
include a premium for cost increases actually 
experienced by grantees simply imply too much 
risk and associated volatility. Foundation fiducia-
ries could quite sensibly and prudently reach that 
conclusion and set investment targets lower. But 
then a foundation adopting this view is in reality 
a spend-down organization, and must recognize 
that in its program strategy given the long-run 
legal mandates of spending at 5 percent plus 
uncovered expenses per year. 
Inflation rates are, of course, not the sole criteria 
that comes into play in balancing the issues asso-
ciated with the choice between the perpetual and 
the spend-down models. But reduction in pur-
chasing power due to inflation is likely among 
the more potent factors if the decision is to be 
made solely on an economic basis of maximizing 
social utility. And the importance of an aware-
ness of whether or not one is spending down on 
real purchasing power seems unquestionable. 
What Type of Initiative?
Considering the inflation issue from a different 
direction, many foundations are now subjecting 
their programs to cost-benefit or cost-effective-
ness analysis in comparing alternative initiatives. 
Although a wide range of approaches with signif-
icant variance in the degree of economic explic-
itness are used for these purposes, those analyses 
turn either analytically or conceptually on some 
sense of the amounts invested in the programs. 
Particularly for long-term programs, all invested 
amounts should be brought forward into current 
dollars in order to make consistent comparisons 
among alternative programs. The compounding 
effect of inflation rates (in this case, revaluing 
upwards previously invested amounts) poten-
tially will make a material difference in the rela-
tive amounts invested if alternative initiatives are 
to be considered on a consistent basis.
In general, the adjustments called for by all of the 
above analysis can be quite simple in practice yet 
still add meaningfully to a foundation’s ability 
to model the economic environment in which 
it functions. Consider, just as one example, a 
foundation based in a major metropolitan area 
whose programs are mostly in that urban area 
and are of the direct-services type. In accounting 
for inflation, such a foundation might wish to 
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use core CPI (that is, the CPI without energy and 
food), plus an amount reflecting recently pre-
vailing HEPI premiums over general inflation. 
This would capture both that gas utilization is 
much lower in most major metropolitan areas 
than in the U.S. generally and that grantees of 
this nature are almost certainly labor intensive. 
(Alternatively, there are now a variety of urban 
indices which might merit consideration, but 
“core” versions of these indices — e.g., minus 
energy and food — may not be available.) To this 
should be added 25 to 50 basis points for taxes or 
expenses that are not includable. Keep in mind 
also that there is a difference between price lev-
els, which may be higher in this metro area than 
in the nation as a whole, and percentage changes 
in price levels due to inflation. The base price 
level for this foundation should be thought of 
as reflecting these higher urban costs and, if the 
program focus should change to jurisdictions 
with different cost levels, the base in effect could 
be readjusted. 
As this example illustrates, some relatively 
straightforward analysis of the grantee portfo-
lio can be important. To begin, is that portfolio 
in fact characterized by greater labor inten-
sity? Then, are there other factors, commod-
ities, or specific costs of particular relevance? 
Construction or infrastructure costs, food prices, 
and costs associated with scientific research 
(which can swing widely, in both directions, 
from standard CPI measures) would all be exam-
ples here. Are considerations of location import-
ant, as in the different pricing environments 
faced by urban, suburban, or rural grantees? In 
particular, in the case of grantmaking in other 
countries, actual inflation in the relevant econ-
omy (after adjustment for exchange-rate changes) 
is what determines purchasing power parity. 
These inflation considerations can also play a 
meaningful role in setting important strategic 
paths for a foundation. In considering the pros 
and cons of perpetual versus spend-down mod-
els, and in determining where one actually is 
on the spectrum defined by those two models, a 
realistic premium to the general level of inflation 
should, where appropriate, be incorporated into 
the thinking. At least in the current economic 
environment, the return target (and the associ-
ated risk levels that would need to be accepted 
to, on average, achieve that target) may be an 
important factor. Further, in comparing alter-
native initiatives with respect to historical or 
projected outcome performance, constant dollar 
calculations should be used to provide a consis-
tent method of comparison. 
These points may all be, at least per year, rela-
tively small, but they can amount to important 
effects. After all, a 7 1/2-cent raise was at the 
center of The Pajama Game, which ended up 
winning the 1954 Tony Award for Best Musical. 
Small amounts can tell an interesting story.
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